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The Nowhere Man

When the "Miracle"
Turned to Mush

David Nyhan

He didn 't steal money, go to jail, become embroiled in a personal scandal, or appoint a
pack of thieves to high office, as other Massachusetts politicians have on occasion. But
his fall was as dramatic as if he had done any or all of the above. From winning reelection
in 1986 with 69 percent of the vote, then capturing the Democrats' presidential nominasank

tion, his fortunes

like

a stone.

Michael Stanley Dukakis, the stoic son of Greek immigrants became a figure of ridicule
in his third term. Thanks to the regional economy 's sharp recession and the lingering
,

effects

of the negative radiation he absorbed

in the presidential

campaign, Dukakis plum-

meted in public esteem.
'

From the wand-waver of the 'Massachusetts Miracle to the dehumanized and demonized Nowhere Man of 1990, the governor and his travails are traced by a newspaper columnist who has chronicled his career.
This saga of sadness and remorse says something about Dukakis, the defining figure of
Massachusetts politics over the past two decades. But it says something more about the
state we are in, and the state it is in. And that, by and large, is not very complimentary.
'

'

The whole art of government consists in the art of being honest. Only aim
duty, and mankind will give you credit where you fail.

to

do your

1

— Thomas Jefferson

This election isn't about ideology.
That was
in accepting the

all

he asked: judge

It's

about competence."

me on my performance.

Democrats' 1988 presidential nomination,

It

was the standard he raised
words. And com-

in just those

petence was the flag he'd flown in winning three races for governor in Massachusetts.

Michael Stanley Dukakis
tions.

"What you

citizens of states far
polite, friendly,

may

not like

my

built a remarkable political career on the plainest of foundawhat you get" is how he explained himself a thousand times to the
from where he'd been three times elected governor. Short, slim,

see

but

is

all

business:

You may not find

me particularly warm and cuddly. You

philosophy of activist, do-something-about-it government. I'm not your

David Nyhan, author of a book about the 1988 Democratic presidential primary campaign and writer for
Creators Syndicate, is a political columnist and associate editor at the Boston Globe.
'
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basic song-and-dance

man; no smile-and-a-shoeshine

politician.

But

if

you want your

government competently run, I'm your man.
That was his pitch. It went over big with the homefolks, sleek with pride in the economic gains that made Massachusetts the go-go state of the mid-1980s. The voters purred
as good times crested in the high-tech, defense, banking, insurance, and service sectors
that flourished in Boston and its suburbs.
The voters who'd elected him over incumbent Francis Sargent in 1974, then dumped

him for maverick Democrat Edward King in 1978, brought him back in 1982, then gave
him the keys a third time. Dukakis was reelected in 1986 with 69 percent of the vote,
crushing Republican George Kariotis in the most lopsided gubernatorial election in Massachusetts for more than a century. He wrote, in a 1988 book with economist Rosabeth
Moss Kanter,

When I began my

term as governor

in its

in 1975,

many

Massachusetts, like so

.

.

.

Statewide unemployment

hit a

bounced back

.

.

Employment

in

.

.

.

Since

a second time [the 1983 recession] but

achieved a level of economic success that stands as an example of what
.

We

high of 12.3 per-

and over 330,000 workingwomen and workingmen were without jobs

then, Massachusetts has not only

America

other

worst economic condition since the Great Depression.

New Appalachia

were called the
cent,

first

was

industrial states,

Massachusetts rose from 2.27 million

in

is

possible for

1975

to 3 mil-

lion in 1987. 2

This was the meat and gravy of politics, extolling the "Massachusetts Miracle." That
litle tidbit of alliterative sloganeering eventually made him gag. Mouthing off about
some kind of miracle came back to haunt the Duke. But as late as 1988, using all the optimistic, can-do catchwords that came to serve as the shorthand vocabulary of his success-

juicy

ful presidential

primary campaign— "diversity.

partnership

infrastructure

.

competence

.

.

far

.

.

.

.

.

fiscal health

.

.

private-public

.

— Dukakis promoted his economic

investing in people"

and wide.

True, he occasionally dismissed the "miracle" label as showy, exaggerated, nonlawyerly, even un-Duke-like But in their
.

Dukakis:

An American

book published just before

the 1988 campaign,

Odyssey, two of my Boston Globe colleagues, Charles Kenney and

Robert L. Turner, went over the "miracle" claims

He does not shy away from taking

at least

some

in exquisite detail.

credit,

and has not been reticent about

describing the situation as "the most extraordinary economic turnaround of any

maybe,

in the history of the

United States"

taking primary credit for having

1987 that "the

first

And my answer

is,

made the

.

.

.

miracle happen was

question I'm asked wherever
"3

'Yes,

we

state,

Perhaps the closest he has come to

I

go

is,

when he

'Can you do

it

said in August
for us here?'

can.'

So what happened?
Dukakis got himself nominated
election campaign.

for president

by running a shrewd and

He impressed everyone, and shook the Republican

skillful

Party to

primary

its

roots,

by stage-managing the Democrats' most successful national convention since 1976 (the
year

Jimmy Carter captured for the Democrats the only national election they have won
Then he ran a disorganized, largely themeless campaign for the general

in

the last six).

And got himself clocked.
He lost forty of the fifty states. The most richly

election.

account of his defeat

is

detailed and relentlessly

contained in a book written by two

leagues, Christine Black and

Thomas

documented

more of my Boston Globe

Oliphant, All by Myself. Their bottom line:

col-

He was

most respects an

in

ideal candidate for the long grind in the primaries: disci-

plined, steady, the safest of bets. Dukakis failed to realize that in presidential politics

you go down the track. Trapped within

the hurdles get higher as

never prepared himself to clear them
riding on

him by

.

.

then, however, he had

no

right not to

especially after having been told what he would face

be ready for that frenzy, no right
.

.

.

In the final phase of a presidential election, however, there

you either make the grand gesture, you either fight

is

no time

for the prize, or

for retailing;

you are almost

certain to lose, especially to the determined cynicism in a crusade of vilification.

when

believe that

the crunch

he

his self-sufficiency,

.With the hopes of millions of Americans

We

came, Dukakis was overwhelmed. 4

So. He ran. He lost. And he came home as if nothing had changed, and he still had
command of all the weapons in his arsenal, with all their potency, that were his before he
lost the presidency.

Wrong, wrong, wrong, Michael.

Next, for a combination of personal, public, and political reasons, he decided to finish

Some advisers

out the remaining two years of his third term as governor.
resign the governorship in the
state:

summer of 1988 and chuck

my heart is

November 1988,

no longer

in

it. I

the wiser course

want more time with

was

my

Dukakis, as he did everything
govern. Keep on keeping on.
his time

was

else, did

And

it

his

felt that after

Thanks,

to say:

family, so

Evelyn Murphy, the lieutenant governor, take over for the

suggested he

problems of running the

dedicate yourself totally to the presidential campaign. Others

crushing loss in

till

the

I

it's

the

been great, but

resign as governor. Let

two years of our term.

last

way: he would persevere. Continue to

run the state with his customary dignity and dedication

up. That decision proved disastrous for his political fortunes.

reputation he'd erected over three decades of public

opprobrium unleashed by the ensuing fiscal collapse.
Proclaiming himself a lame duck in the January 1989

Much of the

was flattened by a hurricane of

life

State of the State

message was a

more devastating
that made a mockery of his

decision that was to emasculate his initiatives in the legislature. But even
to his final

two years

in office

was the steep economic decline

administration's revenue projections and precipitated the fiscal crisis that shredded Dukakis's reputation.

All through the mid-1980s Massachusetts
trial state,

6.

1

unemployment was the lowest of any indusit was climbing steeply, to

dipping to 2.7 percent in 1988. But two years later

percent in July 1990. Massachusetts exceeded the national rate of 5.5 percent for the

first

time in a decade, and jobs were evaporating in manufacturing, construction, com-

puters,

and defense. In

that

than 1,800 jobs per day.
loss that

By

month
late

the

commonwealth

lost

57,000 jobs, a rate of more

September 1990, the administration was looking

had reached 100,000 for the year and projected another 80,000 loss

ing year that

All the

at a job

for the ensu-

would put unemployment over 8 percent.

New England states were hard hit by the downturn,

but

it

was Massachusetts

drove the region's economy, Massachusetts workers whose wages had gone up as
10 percent per year.

And

it

was the

politicians

on duty

in

Massachusetts

who

that

much

as

caught the

most flak when the downturn came.

Of those, by
downwardly

somehow came to
happened.

If

most

far the

spiraling

you

inviting target

economy

was the governor. Beyond the complexities of a
Dukakis

lay the implacable resentment of the electorate.

serve as the emotional catch basin, the totem for everything bad that

lost

your job, couldn't

pay more in taxes, a handy

little

sell

your house, suffered cuts in services, had to

scapegoat was right

at

hand: Dukakis. Forget the sins of

bankers, computer executives, developers, entrepreneurs.

It

was

all

the

Duke's

fault.

His
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hallmark over decades in Massachusetts politics had been his

Now he suddenly

integrity.

who'd touted the nation on the virtues of the Massachusetts Miracle only to
come home to a state economy that rapidly descended into shambles.
Never mind that every other state in the Northeast, from Virginia to Maine, soon folbecame a

liar

lowed Massachusetts on the path

and

lost.

Their governors had not run for president

to red ink.

—

His greatest political burden was the widely shared perception that Dukakis had

misled Massachusetts voters about their fiscal plight to increase his chances of winning
the

White House.

Two weeks before Dukakis was nominated for president,

the following warning

was

spread wide upon the front page of the Boston Globe: "The chaos surrounding the Massachusetts budget, both for the current fiscal year and the one just ended, has

moved beyond

eye-glazing home-state financial arcana and has emerged as a national political issue that

could significantly undermine Gov. Dukakis' preferred image as a competent manager

and economic wizard." 5
Later Dukakis would claim that he tried to trim the state's economic sails. "I vetoed
$200 million in spending approved by the Legislature on the day I left for Atlanta (and the
Democratic national convention) back in 1988," Dukakis told me in a September 1990
interview. But it was too little, too late, at every stage of a dizzying two-year descent to
BBB bond ratings. The low point came in that September with an emergency $310 million
state

budget cut that was virtually dictated

gunpoint by Wall Street bond dealers. They

at

threatened to reduce the state's bond rating to junk level unless the budget was brought
into precarious balance.

This seems to be the bottom line of the widespread disenchantment with the governor:
he,

and

his key aides, kept touting the effectiveness of his governing, after the state pla-

teaued and began nosing down.
state

It

did not matter that the shrewdest businessmen in the

were similarly gulled, or that there had been ample warning

In another state, or with another politician, that might not
geration, a

little

fudging, a

little

buck passing, a

little

signs.

seem

like

much: a

little

exag-

song and dance, and the damage

might not be nearly so severe. For Dukakis, the economic roller coaster took him right
into the cellar,

below the

level of political respectability into the

dank netherworld of ap-

proval ratings below 20 percent. "Serial killers do not have approval ratings as low as

20 percent," cracked one
numbers.

political technician

Why did he fall from grace,
churning

momentum that his

fall

so

far,

so

shaking his head over the Duke's polling

fast,

and with such sickening, stomach-

friends and supporters

winced

at his fate?

The answer is

complex.

Where do you
political,

start in

economic,

cataloguing the reasons?

social, historical.

Were

looking for reasons, but no one could say, not even the

most.

One

of the newspapermen

way: "You never hear him

say,

they personal?

Of course. And

There were hundreds of reasons, once you

who'd chronicled

started

Duke himself, which mattered

his rise over

T was wrong, I made a mistake,

twenty years put
it's

my

fault.'

it

this

That's his

problem."

Beginning on the day after the presidential election, in speeches and

in

news confer-

ences, Dukakis nibbled away at the hard cheese of admitting flaws. But his rationalizations never

A lot of
economy

bought him any understanding. People weren't buying

it

that

it.

Why?

home, a steep, sharp, severe downturn in the
caught everyone flat-footed. Knocking Dukakis became a way of venting

had

to

do with hard times

at

10

fury for

all

who

the Establishment figures

old Massachusetts Miracle.

failed to discern the

The computer wizards,

rocky road ahead for the

the high-flying high-tech crowd, the

investment bankers, the go-go real estate developers, hot-shot businessmen
too fast, Boston-based bankers

who

who expanded

kept lending after real estate crested, they

all

crashed

along with the handlers of state government. But nobody had voted for them.

The

closest

I

ever heard Dukakis

come

to trying to spread

captains of industry, development, computers, and finance
their enterprises

didn't

make any

some of the blame

who

to the

presided over declines

was when he talked one afternoon about bad bank loans: "Hey, the

in

state

of those loans."

There were a number of political trends, some specific

to Massachusetts, others de-

rived from the nation at large, that conspired to frustrate the governor. Washington had
steadily trimmed back the flow of money to the states and local governments in the 1980s.
The year before Ronald Reagan took office only 76 percent of all state and local spending
came from state and local taxes. In George Bush's first year in office, that was up to 83

percent.

6

Like forty-nine other governors, Dukakis was
prevaricating about the need for

new

taxes.

hemmed

in

by a decade of presidential

Ronald Reagan tripled the national debt on

his

George Bush added two years of "No new taxes" and "Read my lips"
finally
breaking
his vow halfway through his term. Under Reagan and Bush, the
before
Republicans embraced the no-new-taxes-are-necessary theme. And the public bought it.
Two popular presidents spent ten years persuading the folks that more taxes were unnecessary. Never mind that thirty-four states were in the red by the summer of 1990. The
eight-year watch.

we don't need new taxes, and that's that. Period.
was a new phenomenon, discernible here as well as

president says

Then

there

in states far

from Mas-

sachusetts: a decreasing willingness, or an increasing unwillingness, of one voting bloc to

support the needs of another.

As

voters

came

to pick

and choose among ballot referenda,

or Proposition 272 overrides, or school bond issues, the trend
for

what helps me, no

for

became unmistakable. Yes

what helps you. The elderly wanted money

for their

ambulance

attendants or meals or medical programs that benefited their age bracket, but they voted

resoundingly against spending public

What was meat and drink to one

money on

schools or playgrounds.

ethnic or class grouping was fat and waste to another.

With the federal government retrenching from domestic programs, with Proposition 2V2
limiting

how much real

estate tax

money

was forced

a city or town could pour into maintaining

fill the gap. During the flush times of the midup by 10 or 12 or 15 percent in yearly increments, it was possible to pick up the slack by increasing local aid. By 1990 the typical Bay
State city or town got 37 percent of its money directly from the state tax pool
$2 billion

services or schools, the state

1980s,

when

to

the state's tax yield vaulted

—

worth.

But when the tax haul began

and legislators cast about for ways to cut exupon each other with gusto. There was a sharp
increase in angst. Bitter charges were flung hither and yon. One of the few principles on
which pleaders for special interests agreed was that the governor and the legislature were
sure doing a lousy job of managing this downturn.
The legislature became a killing ground for civility and intelligent discourse, polarized
between taxers and antitaxers. Barely one fifth of the 160-member House and 40-member
Senate had served a decade or more, so few had ever had to vote to raise taxes in the midst
of an economic downturn. That task proved too daunting for them until, in July 1990,
to dwindle,

penses, the various lobbying groups

fell

11
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fully

two years after the

dollar-plus tax package

state

was

budget was acknowledged to be on the skids, a major billion-

finally

wrung from

the bitterly divided legislators.

Running a close second to Dukakis in terms of public scorn was the legislature and its
leadership. House Speaker George Keverian, Democrat of Everett, tried to conduct a
statewide campaign for the office of treasurer and receiver general while he was trying to
construct a tax package that would meet the revenue need and attract a majority of votes

on the House

floor.

Cruelly lampooned by

some

in the

media, deserted by a number of his

own

leadership

appointees, and repeatedly undercut by his archrival on the third floor, Senate President

William Bulger, Keverian was savagely battered from
after a

all sides.

By

early August 1990,

massive tax package was finally cemented into place, Keverian went public with

his distaste for Bulger: "I don't respect his style of leadership,

about."

It is

safe to

assume

that

and

that's

what

it's all

Bulger returned the sentiment.

Even some of his closest allies threw up their hands at Keverian's backing and filling.
The Speaker talked repeatedly of the antagonism he encountered in the street and on the
campaign

trail.

Voters were furious, and he was a big target. In September he was de-

feated in the Democratic primary for treasurer.

—

Even though both House and Senate were lopsidedly Democratic in numbers
approxthe House leadership lost control of the Democrats
1 in both branches
early on in the financial swoon. Keverian was every bit as much of a lame duck as Duka-

—

imately 4 to

kis, a factor

underappreciated by those outside the legislature.

vote to a legislator,

who

quickly learns that you

program or pay

for their

raise,

A vote for taxes is a painful

make people happy by

giving them

money

and you make people unhappy by taking money from them

in taxes.

Legislators calculated, selfishly to be sure, but coldly and logically, that Dukakis, on

way out, did not have to defend a vote for higher taxes in the next election. Thus it
would make more political sense to await the blandishments of the new governor before
giving away a vote for taxes. These same legislators, some of them longtime friends of
his

many of them beneficiaries of his largess as Speaker, decided to stiff Good Old
George just as they stiffed that no-good blankety -blank so-and-so in the corner office.
Why not wait and make your deal with the next Speaker?
As the Democratic establishment came under increasing pressure, it began to melt
down. There was a pronounced bifurcation of the nearly seamless web of Democratic
Keverian,

officeholders in the one-party

state.

The Washington crowd, Senators Edward Kennedy

and John Kerry, and the ten of eleven congressmen who were Democrats, gave the
fiscal

state

problems a good leaving alone.

In the election year the

Democrats were assailed

as top-heavy, corrupt, out of touch.

Scandals, old and new, were recycled. Sexual problems,

money problems, marital probThe Democrats appeared

lems, conflict of interest problems, dotted the media landscape.
to

be leaderless,

dence;

it

seemed

inept, disorganized, distracted.
to languish like

The party had no enthusiasm, no

communism under Leonid

confi-

Brezhnev.

The Republicans, trying to win back the governor's office for the first time in twenty
pounced gleefully on every Democratic miscue. One of the striking differences

years,

between Massachusetts and
relative

impotence of the

virtually the

New York, and New Jersey was the
Those other northeast states suffered

states like Connecticut,

GOP in Massachusetts.

same kind of economic distress and sinking tax yields. Still, Republicans
controlThey had sufficient clout in their legislatures

—

there were part of the solution.

12

— so that Democratic governors had to deal with them

ling the majority in

some branches

and include them

any recovery plans with a chance of passage.

in

Massachusetts Republicans settled on
matter

how broke

this strategy:

oppose any and

the state gets. Fiscal stability and the

of winning the governor's office for the

first

bond

rating

taxes, period,

all

were risked

time since Frank Sargent turned

it

in

no

hopes

over to

—

ugh — Dukakis in 1974.

The attempt
when,

Bay

in a

State

to paint the

speech

at

Democrats

Democrats were mired

must have come as a shock

Under

as profligate spenders took an international turn

Harvard, Republican gubernatorial candidate William

to the reps

the generally articulate

Republican of Westfield,

propping up the bar

command of House

said

who based his campaign

at the

Golden

slightly

Dome

pub.

Minority Leader Steven Pierce,

for the

GOP gubernatorial

on a no-new-taxes-for-the-next-four-years pledge, House Republicans
the media flames of antitax fever.
To Pierce's barbs were added the

Weld

F.

"a European-Socialist philosophy." 7 Such a sobriquet

in

nomination

settled for fanning

more humorous, but often just

as acerbic,

wisecracks of House Taxation Committee Chairman John Flood, Democrat of Canton, a

former telephone company pole-climber-turned-lawyer.

Democratic
at the

fiscal conservative until

Democratic

state

in full cry,

antitaxers like Flood, Keverian
steadily diminishing pool.

largely late

fell

He campaigned

for governor as a

short of the 15 percent delegate total threshold

convention in early June, and missed making the ballot.

With the Republicans

to enlist the help of

he

and Democratic defectors rallying behind born-again

and Dukakis found themselves fishing

Dukakis and

groups that benefited from

and lame when

it

came time

for protax votes in a

his cadre of inner-circle adviser-survivors sought
state spending.

But such groups were

to deliver specific votes in the

House.

Labor unions, government employees, and groups that had succeeded in lobbying legislatures for ever-higher spending programs also found they had worn out their welcome
with the public at large. The people were furious over what a large majority perceived to

be waste,

fat,

fraud, and

mismanagement on a

There was a corresponding surge

industry lobbyists, and trade groups.
legislative leader
ists to

now working

vast scale in state government.

in the influence

"For

of commerce, business organizations,

the first time in

my

career," said a retired

"members were

as an occasional lobbyist,

calling lobby-

find out what was going on, instead of vice versa."

Particularly effective at the end of the 1980s was the Massachusetts High Tech Council,
which had spearheaded antitax sentiments. Its chief executive, Howard Foley, was the

principal architect of a draconian tax and fee rollback intended to capitalize

sentiment by asking voters
vote, all tax increases

if

and fee hikes imposed by the

state

nents predicted widespread dislocation and disruption
stripped

on antitax

November 1990 referendum
since the middle of 1988. Oppo-

they wanted to repeal, with a

from the precariously balanced $13

if

a projected $3.8 billion was

billion state budget over a period of eighteen

months.

"We're in yahoo time in politics in this state," said Robert J. Bezucha, a history profesAmherst College in his fourth year as a member of the board of trustees of Westfield

sor at

(Massachusetts) State College.

we

"Our bond

rating

is

right

down

there with Louisiana, and

don't even have Earl in the corner office. We're the only state that has actually reduced

funding for higher education. Virtually
higher education. They treat

it

[as

all

if] it's

the candidates running for governor beat up on

the public

works department. 8

A raucous rump media trio calling itself The Governors was formed by

13

Citizens for
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Limited Taxation lobbyist Barbara Anderson,

WRKO talk show host Jerry Williams, and

Boston Herald columnist Howie Carr. They formed a bumptious claque braying de-

nouncements of Dukakis and the "hacks" of State House politics. The talk show trashing
who suggested that new taxes were needed helped delay, but could not forestall,

of anyone

the eventual adoption of a series of unpopular tax hikes.

In 1989 Williams was given an award for public service by a delighted Republican State

Committee. What was even more surprising was Jerry showing up

to

claim

it.

became such an enjoyable blood

tematic denigration of state political figures

The

sys-

sport that the

lowbrow humor of Howie Carr was declared fit for the elite viewers of the Ten O 'Clock
News on Boston's PBS outlet, Channel 2. Carr was featured till a viewer/contributor
revolt caused that connection to

standing, the barbs of

audience
crats as

among

be quietly severed. Channel 2's change of heart notwith-

"The Governors" echoed

in the State

House. They found a ready

Demo-

not just the outnumbered Republicans, but with such conservative

Greg Sullivan of Norwood, who abandoned

the leadership for conservative bed-

fellows in the media.

Talk radio became a sort of bulletin board for antitax activists. Station managers were

Advertising income depends on numbers of listeners, and one surefire way of

thrilled.

drawing a horde on the crowded

dial

was

to

No one

emphasize denunciations of tax hikes.

liked to raise taxes, but radio-borne theories about conspiracies, waste, fraud, and dirty

deeds in the political world fleshed out a vision of a conspiratorial world with good guys,

bad guys, and

all sorts

of side plots.

Dukakis made no dent

in the

May

cacophony, despite repeated efforts like his

15, 1990,

speech to the Boston Chamber of Commerce.
First,

some

facts about taxes

third wealthiest state in

and spending

in

Massachusetts: Massachusetts

Our revenue burden

of growth in personal income of any state in the nation.

and local taxes and fees as a percentage of personal income
lowest in the county

number of state,

.

.

.

is

now

the

America. Over the past nine years, we've had the highest rate

Our property

—

is

— state

currently the eighth

taxes are the lowest in the Northeast

.

.

.

The

country, and municipal employees in Massachusetts, per capita,

is

below the national average.

The public
campaign

largely ignored his explanations.

that

As when

protesting in the presidential

he was neither unpatriotic nor uncaring toward his wife, Dukakis seemed

be shouting into a wind that snatched his words away without
tively

effect.

to

Having been effec-

dehumanized by the Republican presidential campaign, Dukakis was denied a hearbecome used to tuning him out. They did it

ing on the tax and spending issues. People had
automatically.

Massachusetts was not alone in giving talk radio a shot in the ratings arm with contentious dialogue.

New Jersey

Governor James Florio hiked taxes and won himself a

radio claque of critics. "In a state without a network television station,

formed

itself

almost overnight from a soothing 'adult contemporary' music station into

the nerve center of

what

is

becoming an angry

revolt against tax increases

through the Legislature by the new governor," the
has

become

New

the focal point for anti-Florio sentiment."

a Massachusetts clone,

political

it is

the

and media establishment

Garden
that

rammed

York Times reported.

"The

station

9

New Jersey is the state most like Massachusetts in some ways.
lation 6 million), has a similar industrial
is

built-in

WKXW has trans-

It is

the

same

size (popu-

mix, an educated work force, and so on. If there
State. It did not

while Dukakis was

14

seem

to register

mud wrestling

on the Bay State

with the legisla-

ture to

win passage of a $1

billion

package for the Garden

package, Governor Florio rammed home a S2.8
So harsh was the reaction, according to the New York
taking office, Gov. Jim Florio is confronted with a

.4 billion tax

State.

Times, that "barely six months after

growing tax revolt that is fast turning into a general wave of discontent threatening his
dominance of the machinery of government in New Jersey.""'
In the first six months of 1990, legislative discipline had more or less collapsed in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. The House is the key legislative body because,
under the

state constitution, all tax

and spending measures must originate there.

Fragile majorities of eighty-one votes for

new

taxes crumbled repeatedly under the

withering fire of antitax forces. Casting about repeatedly for support

in the

business

community and among the professions, Dukakis and Keverian found their pleas largely
ignored. They discovered that the business community, the Establishment, wanted little
part of the struggle.

Many businessmen had
tives in

their

own problems. Where big bankers and

decades past had exercised vast clout

in the inner circles

insurance execu-

of government, that was

no longer the case. The Vault, an informal organization of Boston's largest employers,
played virtually no role in the searing public debate over the state's fiscal fortunes.

bond

BBB,

ratings plunged to

the business

the lowest of any state

community remained on

As

on the Standard and Poor's ranking,

the sidelines.

A few braved the brickbats. John Gould, the chief executive of the largest industry
met repeatedly with government and busisome semblance of sanity amidst the fiscal free-fall. But the

lobby, Associated Industries of Massachusetts,

ness leaders to try to restore

and controversy ladled out in the newspapers and the talk shows by antitax
spokesmen seemed to intimidate most business leaders. One high-ranking bank executive
who headed a gubernatorial committee was denounced as "a fat-cat banker" by CLT
spokesman Anderson for not being sufficiently antitax. That example was not lost on his
vilification

brethren,

New

who had their own problems

in the credit

and real estate crunch

that left

some of

England's strongest banks reeling. The net effect was that most businessmen slunk

away from any meaningful role

in addressing the fiscal crisis.

The business Establishment seemed to have been deconstructed. Private sector figures
who in decades past assumed leading roles in the community were no longer as evident.

Many

corporations that were previously headquartered in Boston had been absorbed by

even larger organizations elsewhere. "They're

one business lobbyist trying
referendum.

to raise

all

branch managers here now," grumped

funds to fend off the

And the men who remained in Boston

their predecessors

The media were

had

in the

filled

CLT petition in the November

could no longer

call the shots the

way

1970s and 1980s.

with a good deal more negativity. Those with an interest in public

policy, or raising or lowering the taxation level, discovered the effectiveness of the kinds

of negative advertising that had

come to

characterize political campaigns.

Hortonizing" of Massachusetts politics meant that those
either side risked a

mud bath from groups opposed to

The "Willie
fray on

who dared enter the

their goals.

stand that a banker or business leader has thousands of customers,

very strongly about taxes, and those businessmen take a risk

if

"You've got

to

under-

some of whom

feel

they raise a voice against

CLT, a risk of retaliation by some of their customer base," said one anti-CLT organizer.
The political toll was evident in other states. Connecticut Governor William O'Neill and
Vermont Governor Madeleine Kunin, forced, like Dukakis, to raise taxes, decided not to
run again when polls showed they faced expensive uphill struggles. Rhode Island's Republican Governor

Edward DiPrete ran

into the

15

same kind of political buzz saw

that

had
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chipped the bark off Dukakis's hide. Virginia's new Democratic Governor Douglas

Wilder encountered his

own

fiscal

Hampshire and John McKernan

sandstorm. Republican incumbents Judd Gregg

New

in

Maine scrambled to cover shortfalls that were roughly
proportional to those of Massachusetts. Only New York's Mario Cuomo, facing token
Republican opposition, seemed to escape the blight that affected every other northeastern
state

in

incumbent.

But none of these others had run for president brandishing their competence.

None had

to live

down

And lost.

the taunts of the Massachusetts Miracle. Dukakis had been highly

touted as a consensus builder, an architect of compromise, a healer of wounds, and a mid-

wife of compromise during the glory years of the Massachusetts Miracle. But that touch

eluded him

when he needed

most.

it

public gatherings, shunned by those

He became, almost eerily, a kind of nonperson in
who wished to make a favorable impression on the

populace.

The

night that Nelson

Esplanade

in the

Mandela appeared before a huge and rapturous throng on

summer

South African leader.

the

of 1990, various local dignitaries greeted the wildly popular

When Mandela thanked Dukakis

for being

one of the

first

American

governors to lend his support to the imprisoned black leader's cause, the crowd's

mood

turned briefly ugly.

A ninteen-year-old woman who was present said afterward,
part of the

whole

day. All

my

friends had been singing

Mandela, and then when he thanked Dukakis,
do they do

that,

effort there?

when Dukakis was one of the

Some

my

"That was the only ugly

and clapping and cheering

friends started booing

politicians

who really

for

Why

and jeering.

tried to help the black

of my friends blame Dukakis for not being able to get a job this sum-

It made me sick."
The opprobrium that became Dukakis's steady diet unsettled even some who were
sympathetic to him. A Greek- American woman who voted for him told me she dreamed

mer. But

is

that really his fault?

about the governor. "I had a dream.

And in my dream,

he was stabbed

bleedT His public persona was so demeaned, so dehumanized,
disposed toward him saw him as a bloodless figure. Another

what had happened

to the liberal

— but he didn

that even a

woman who was

champion of 1988 turned from a

television

chastened Dukakis waiting to address a surly legislature and said sadly,

't

person well
heartsick at

image of a

"He looks

so

'."

small, so diminished

There was

little

question that Dukakis's stature as a national leader had shrunk by the

end of the presidential campaign. His negative ratings soared as the Republicans used
millions of dollars' worth of negative television advertising to

sow doubts about

his patri-

otism, his values, and his record.

Dukakis was badly mauled

Germond and Jules Witcover

in the

1988 general election campaign, concluded Jack

W

Whose Broad Stripes and Bright Stars ? The Trivial Pursuit of the Presidency, 1988. The Bush campaign, they wrote, "made a conscious and
critical strategic decision to define Dukakis in the most negative way possible as the most
effective means to combat the voters' very negative view of Bush ... In the hands of
in

Bush's hired guns, the concept of campaign as educational exercise crumbled before the
concept of campaign as warfare, and Dukakis was gunned

Then

down

in the process.""

George Bush might have put it had he lost. In American politics at the highest level there is no second place, no silver medal. Winning is better, because winning is all. Winners, if they don't write the history books of political
campaigns, get the lion's share of attention from those who do the writing. Dukakis won
more votes, more states, and more counties than Walter Mondale, than Jimmy Carter,
there's "the loser thing," as
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than George
It

McGovern,

mattered not.

way he

the last three

He lost. And many

men

to

of those

precede him as Democratic nominee.

who

voted for him were furious

at the

lost.

He let Bush and the conservatives tarnish liberalism and demean the patriotism and
common sense and goodness not only of Dukakis but, by electoral implication, of all those
who supported him. When the Bush wrecking crew of James W. Baker, John Sununu,
Roger Ailes, and Lee Atwater got through with Dukakis, he was a mess. You were a
sucker

if

you voted for

this sorry

sad sack was the prevailing negative message of the Bush

was propped up neatly by the positive theme, the "kinder, gentler'" Bush,
whose paid commercials showed him hoisting handsome grandchildren for a grandfatherly snuggle. But what they did to Dukakis was not pretty, not kind, not gentle.

campaign.

It

Dukakis wound up with 42 millon votes and relatively few friends, because so many of
those

who

voted for him were angry that he hadn't fought harder.

"Loserhood

is

the bete noire of Americans;

it is

the condition that

MBAs and college

students throughout the United States fear most," wrote Donald L. Kanter and Philip H.

Mirvis

in a

book analyzing cynicism

respect are only grudgingly given,

at

the end of the 1980s.

if at all, to

anyone

who

is

"...

In

America,

trust

not an obvious winner."

and
i:

Kanter and Mirvis advance the thesis that "the 1980s can be characterized as the cynical
decade, and that the Reagan presidency, while contributing to a fast-paced cycle of high

hopes and disillusionment, has been only one of many ingredients

They carried

ingly jaded outlook."

and

it

in the public's increas-

a step further, to Reagan's surrogate-replacement

political heir.

The

election of 1988

that fear

is

a case in point.

The campaign of George Bush demonstrated

and fantasy can beat complacency and generalities among

electorate that bothered to vote

.

.

.

Initial

that portion of the

appeals to idealism and community were

forsaken for the expediency of negative campaigning, in the one case [Bush] and diviIt was almost a repeat of the previous election, when
Mondale that looking out for oneself was more impor-

siveness, in the other [Dukakis].

a cynical electorate told Walter

tant than reaching out to the less privileged. 13

Others, like Elizabeth Drew, saw Dukakis as fatally flawed in his slowness to sense

what was being done
What Dukakis
other part

to him.

said or failed to say in his

campaign

is

only part of his problem; the

— probably the larger one — has been Bush's ability to paint Dukakis as a

liberal, out of

touch with the mainstream. Yet Dukakis, by his slowness to react, or

even to see the peril in what Bush was doing to him, became an accomplice
strategy.

The Bush White House
shire

staff

Bush's

was headed by an old Dukakis enemy, former

Governor John Sununu. The Bush camp took an unusual

kis at every turn.

up on June

in

I4

One

of Bush's top political aides, Bay State native

2, 1990, at the

Democratic

New Hamp-

interest in scotching

Duka-

Ron Kaufman, turned

state convention, of all places.

Dukakis's farewell

speech to his party was delayed five hours by an unexpected Springfield police union

some Republican political operatives claimed
Kaufman played a role in fomenting the disruption. The Democratic State Committee
sued Kaufman as a result. President Bush, it was reliably reported, was furious that Kaufman got caught skulking around Dukakis's convention. Said a Republican who knew
Kaufman and his brother-in-law, Andrew Card, another Bush assistant: "Andy and Ron

picket line. In the turmoil that followed,
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regard the 1990 governor's race in Massachusetts as the logical conclusion of the 1988
presidential campaign."

Massachusetts Republicans, after twenty years in the wilderness, concluded that their
best chance in two decades depended

upon

their further

already disenchanted Massachusetts voters.

demonizing Dukakis with the

tool kit of each

Dukakis Republican

contained the same three basic implements. These were contentions that (1) he had

critic

lied

The

about the health of the Massachusetts economy; (2) he had spent too freely to cadge

votes and appease special interests; and (3) he delighted in dipping a sticky

paw

into the

pockets of the hard-pressed taxpayers.

Measured against the record of the man who defeated him, the defense could go like
Lies? Did George Bush come clean on the savings and loan crisis, or Iran-contra,

this: (1)

or Pentagon procurement corruption, or white-collar crime in the financial markets, or

mismanagement in the nuclear weapons industry? (2) Spending? Whose
mismanagement cost the taxpayers more? Mine, or Bush's record with the deficit, with
military spending, with farm supports, with Medicaid? (3) Taxes? I never said, "Read
the devastating

my

lips

— no new taxes," then turned around and broke that pledge two years after the

election.

As Dukakis's

favorability sank, Bush's

halfway through his
cartel.

likely

first

remained

at

record-high levels for a president

term, assisted mightily by the virtual collapse of the communist

A poll released in June

1990 by the Becker

among 500

Institute for business clients

Massachusetts voters found that 77 percent held an unfavorable opinion of Dukakis

and 68 percent rated the legislature unfavorably.
Dukakis fared
1990.

Among

better, but still not well, in a national

Boston Globe and
ably,

survey conducted in early April

1,005 registered voters across the country selected by a pollster for the

WBZ-TV, 49 percent of the overall sample viewed Dukakis

unfavor-

while Bush was seen in a favorable light by 77 percent of the same voters. Bush's

popularity stayed high despite the torrent of red ink that poured out of Washington.

Bush's top budgeteer, Richard Darman, warned that mandatory cuts in government

programs "of totally unprecedented size" loomed

for October, triggered

by automatic

spending cuts imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law. The prospect of lopping off a million military personnel, increasing air travel delays by 600 percent, wiping out Pell grants for 3.4 million college students, cutting

from Head

Start,

200,000 preschoolers

reducing drug research and treatment by one-third, mirrored on a na-

tional scale the kinds of disruptions taking place

on the

state level in Massachusetts.

But

Bush's popularity seemed insulated from any voter retribution.

At home, Dukakis's media enemies mocked his standing
the

unwary

first

caucus

that this sly fellow
state,

might

who'd delivered

try again to

the state for

him

in 1988, continued to hold

higher regard than the Massachusetts electorate. But

Dukakis

in his first presidential effort

winced

yet, curiously, kept

run for president. Democrats

at the

many

of the people

who

warning
in Iowa, the

Dukakis

in

supported

thought of his trying again after the

turmoil of 1990.

Some who'd

voted for Dukakis over Bush had second thoughts.

"He never grew,"

said a

powerful media executive who'd admired Dukakis over two decades in which the governor

moved from being

a little-known state representative to the front-running candidate for

president of the United States. "[Dukakis] didn't expand, he didn't change, he didn't

absorb experiences and turn them into something that

Kennedy

did."
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made him

bigger, as Jack

To a

key operative

That

trait

journalists

wrote

who'd been much closer

political insider

his capacity for

growth as

in his

in the presidential

to

Dukakis, the

fault

"He doesn't listen," said
campaign. "He doesn't listenl"

hearing.

of tuning out advice he didn't want to take looms large

who

was not so much

a person

in the

in

who'd been

a

minds of some

who

followed Dukakis's career, like the Boston Herald's Peter Lucas,

in 1989:

He did

not listen to people then

what he had

to

do

And

to win.

— when aides, advisers and fellow politicians told him

there

is

no sign that he

advisers and fellow politicians are telling
that

him

is

when

listening now,

that his credibility

is

shot so

he cannot raise taxes without making more budget cuts. Dukakis

aides,

full

of holes

listens only to

himself.

For reasons
try to get

that defy adequate explanation,

Dukakis

for a long time resisted advice to

ahead of the antitax wave that swept the legislature

to the brink of hysteria.

A

number of knowledgeable politicians urged him to make symbolic cuts in controversial
areas: fire some executive department press secretaries, reduce the number of legislative
doorkeepers and pages,
cific jobs

research bureau,

list

spe-

being vacated.

He resisted
seemed

call for the legislature to eliminate its

such entreaties as unworthy. That would be surrendering to the mob, he

As

to imply.

it

turned out, Dukakis eventually cut 5,000 full-time employees from

the state payroll, by attrition, transfers, early retirements, and a hiring freeze.

of 3,000 part-time jobs. But so long did

it

take, so ineptly

was

it

promoted,

He got

that

rid

he got

It was as if the Duke did not
media and the legislature were forcing on him.
His stubbornness won this tribute from Lucas, a boxing fan, in a July 1990 interview
with me: "Dukakis has proved one thing to me: he showed he can take a punch. A lot of
lesser guys would have been down for the count. The Duke is still standing. That's im-

little

credit for

with the media, or the taxpayers at large.

it

deign to play the

silly

pressive, whether

games

the

you agree with him or not."

The campaign manager

for

John

Silber,

one of the Democratic candidates who sought

to

replace Dukakis, was Robert Donahue, a veteran of Massachusetts campaigns, as well as

McGovern and Jimmy Carter. Donahue traced Dukadilemma to being a lame duck for two long years. "The most tragic mistake he made
was when he announced he wouldn't run for reelection. That made for the longest iameduckness' I've ever seen. He opened up a vacuum that turned into a black hole."
It is undeniable that the success Dukakis achieved with the legislature up to the middle
of 1988 evaporated. Legislators who had quaked at the thought of denying him a vote
became lions overnight. The raw power of a governor in dealing with the microcosm that
is the world of most legislators suddenly disappeared. The munchkins of Lilliput rounded
on the once-mighty Duke. "State reps whom you could have intimidated or bought off
with a dozen summer jobs for their relatives or their constituents suddenly found some
courage and began yelling for his head," said one saturnine veteran of the State House

the presidential efforts of George
kis's

patronage process.

For a governor
highly unusual.
tors.

There

is

It

to declare

two years

in

advance of his departure that he

changes the picture dramatically, particularly

is

in dealing

leaving

is

with legisla-

a great deal of bluff and bluster between executive and legislative branches,

not only in Massachusetts but in every state capitol, and in the Congress to boot.

Marine Corps and the penal system are not the only branches of government
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that rely
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upon

the principle of motivational fear to coerce obedience. Every governor, every presi-

dent,

must threaten, and occasionally deliver on said threats, to compel behavior that
might otherwise find distasteful, uncomfortable, even repulsive. The Duke

a

legislator

Or whip. Or pistol. And

turned himself into a lion tamer without a chair.
lions of Beacon Hill

If

it is

ship,

became

relatively easy to trace

it is

much harder to

the cowardly

tigers against taxes.

how Dukakis became

estranged from the House member-

assay the degree to which Kitty Dukakis's problems affected

the state was governed. On the eve of the first anniversary of her husband's losing the
White House, Kitty Dukakis drank some rubbing alcohol, collapsed, and was rushed to
the hospital. Eight months before that, she'd professed that she was an alcoholic, that her
problem had been with her for some time. She entered a residential treatment facility in
Rhode Island. She discussed some details of her chemical dependency and emotional

how

in Now You Know, published by Simon and Schuster.
How much of Dukakis's swoon was traceable to the pressure of his domestic life

problems

brought to bear by Kitty's professed drug and alcohol dependency and the emotional

burden

that piled atop the

And he has adamantly
blamed

normal wear and tear of political

refused to cite

it

problems.

his personal situation for any of his political

He

pathy because of his wife's repeated hospitalizations.

implying their rebukes were

and her family had
But because

somehow

life?

Only Dukakis knows.

as a factor in his political difficulties.

He

He never

never pitched for sym-

never rounded on his critics by

unfair because of the suffering with which Kitty

to cope.

kind of thing cannot be measured does not

this

mean

it

The

didn't count.

weight of worry and apprehension, the never-ending confidential calculations about her
condition, must have taken their

toll,

not only during the presidential primary campaign

but throughout the bitter months that ensued:
ule?

Can she

get through this interview?

loser-loser" questions

handle

it?

Kitty today? Is she

up

to the sched-

speech? Put up with

all

the "loser-

from the reporters? Will she break and say something nasty

What about when

unfriendly crowd?

How's

Make that

she gets back to the hotel tonight?

Will she be able to get up and get on the plane at six in the morning?

smoking? Drinking?

Is

to

an

How will she
Is

she

she taking pills?

There were pressures of equal magnitude on the family of George Bush, as there are on
the spouses and children of every

dency.

man who makes the

final

round of two

for the presi-

How would Bush have handled it if his beloved Barbara were afflicted with prob-

lems similar

to Kitty's?

lumps

same

in the

Would he have endured

patient fashion as

Would Dukakis have reacted
with George Bush

if

Dukakis?

as stoically?

Would he have taken his

Who knows?

differently in the second

and climactic television debate

he had not been worried about his wife? That was the debate

Bernard Shaw asked the dreadful question: "Governor,

if

Kitty Dukakis

in

which

were raped and

murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for the killer?"
Mishandling

that,

by

totally ignoring the

emotional implications of the hypothetical

damage on Dukakis's chances. It gave millions of Americans
humanity. Never mind that Dukakis had awoke that day with a fever

situation, inflicted untold

reason to doubt his

and severe
But

if

laryngitis.

Every candidate

feels fluish or

Dukakis had not harbored private fears about

unwell

at

times during campaigns.

his wife's well-being,

would he have

I don't, Bernard. And I think you know
opposed the death penalty all during my life. I don't see any evidence that it's a deterrent, and I think there are better and more effective ways to deal with violent crime."

handled that question any better than this? "No,
I've
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If

you

him

like

as a person,

course he would have handled

and as a politician, as
better.

it

Nobody

I

do, your

will ever

answer

know. Now,

hopeful: of

is

it's

water under

dam.

the

is one of sadness and
White House. His reputation for competence turned to ashes. His
wife's travails shattered the tranquillity and privacy of his home life. His name became a
vile epithet to thousands of voters who, taken at their word, actually hate him for what

Measured by

the prevailing standards of politics, the Dukakis saga

remorse.

He

happened

to the

lost the

tion

commonwealth on

who

Politicians

and refused his phone

campaigning for

who

other to see

him

praised

Dukakis

out the

in the

state.

Abuse women

who made

their first trip to the big time in

in various primary states around the nation vied with one anin the

most

most mawkish terms abruptly

He

sins?

stole

upon him

fell

He

no money.

Some journalists who'd

florid language.
at

every opportunity.

corrupted no businessmen.

He

didn't

His personal conduct remained above reproach. Did he sniff cocaine?

for his

relatives in high

calls. Legislators

could denounce him

And what were his
sell

his watch.

previously trailed in his wake like baby ducklings sneered at his men-

own

lust?

Commit any

outrage to public decency or order? Install

and undeserved public places? Follow for any appreciable length the

well-trodden Bay State path of cronyism? No, no, no, no, and no. Well, perhaps rigorous

on the

may

require a "maybe."
from grace was unaccompanied by any of the personal
flaws we associate with such dramatic reversals. He didn't go to prison, like James
scrutiny

last

count

But Dukakis's stunning

Michael Curley.

He

fall

He didn't have close political associates clapped into the calaboose.
He didn't steal, kill, or get caught catting around.

wasn't tarred in a sex scandal.

At every stage of his

political life,

sometimes

in private,

sometimes

— as when

in public

he became governor, as when he declared for the presidency, as when he claimed his party's highest

nomination

— he'd repeated the Athenian pledge vowed in Greece two thou-

"We will never bring disgrace to this country by any act of dishonesty
We will fight for the ideals of this, our country. We will revere and obey the

sand years earlier:
or cowardice.
law.

We will

this

country greater, stronger, prouder and more beautiful than

As he
briefly

strive to

quicken our sense of civic duty. Thus,

leaves the office he's held for twelve years, in

one great time, and

at the

end

in the

handful, praised by few, reviled by many.

in all

ways,

we

bad times then good times,

Measured by the Athenian

By

oath,

sinking so low in opinion polls that no other governor fared as poorly?

It

takes

me back to

the night in

his wife,

and her

New York's Astoria ballroom in
father,

to us."'

;

for

Harry

Ellis

how does

his

losing the presidency?

worst of it? Losing an election, and sinking low in the polls? That's

when Dukakis,

will transmit

was transmitted

worst of times, Dukakis was adored by but a

record stack up? Did he bring disgrace to his state? If so, how?

By

it

Was

that the

all?

the spring of 1988,

Dickson, were mobbed by deliriously

happy Greek- American supporters convinced they would one day dance

White

in the

House. In the motorcade, riding away from the tumult, Dickson, associate conductor of
the Boston Pops and a veteran of six decades in
celebrities to the cause.

"Danny Kaye was my

him to do something

my

for

say to me, 'Harry, stay

As

show

biz,

laughed about trying to enlist

friend for twenty-seven years.

I

tried to get

son-in-law the governor, but he was afraid of politics. He'd

away from

politics. You'll get hurt.'"

16

the car hurtled through the rain under police escort, his daughter sucking

rette, his

ceived, Dickson chortled at the
right?

on a

ciga-

son-in-law basking in the afterglow of the most riotous reception he'd ever re-

"^

memory

of Danny Kaye's caution.

21

"Now

look

at us,
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